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Silverang: The Applicability of Rule 23(e) to Precertification Proceedings:

Comment
THE APPLICABILITY OF RULE 23(e) TO PRECERTIFICATION
PROCEEDINGS: THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH APPLIED
I. INTRODUCTION

Rule 23(e)of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 1 was promulgated in
1966 to provide court supervision of settlements of class actions and to in2
sure that all members of the class would be notified of such settlements. It
has been noted that the purpose of this subsection is to protect the nonparty
members of a class from unfair settlements affecting their rights-i.e., to
prevent abuse of the class action procedure by named or representative par-

ties. 3

Because rule 23(e) requires judicial approval of dismissals or settle-

ments of "class actions," 4 and because a suit is not officially a "class action"
until certified as such by the trial court, 5 the issue has arisen whether rule
1. FED. R. CIv. P. 23(e). The text of rule 23(e) provides: "Dismissal or Compromise. A
class action shall not be dismissed or compromised without the approval of the court, and notice
of the proposed dismissal or compromise shall be given to all members of the class in such
manner as the court directs." Id.
2. See Notes of Advisory Committee on 1966 Amendment to Rule 23, 28 U.S.C. app., at
427 (1976) [hereinafter cited as 1966 Advisory Notes].
3. See 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1797, at 226
(1972). Wright and Miller have stated that "[t]he purpose of subdivision (e) is to protect the
nonparty members of the class from unjust or unfair settlements affecting their rights when the
representatives become fainthearted before the action is adjudicated or are able to secure satisfaction of their individual claims by a compromise." Id. (footnote omitted). The potential for
abusing the class action procedure has been explained as follows:
Most class actions never reach trial. Defendants usually attempt, successfully, to accommodate the claims of a certified class through compromise and settlement. This familiar
pattern (filing suit, class certification, settlement) manifests itself not only when a guilty
defendant simply throws in the towel rather than postpone the inevitable, but also in
those cases in which an innocent defendant, unable to bear the expense, embarrassment
and disruption of class litigation, pays whatever is necessary to be rid of the affair once
and for all. The failure in either case to resolve matters on the merits means that "[t]he
distinctions between innocent and guilty defendants and between those whose violations
have worked great injury and those who have done little if any harm become blurred, if
not invisible. The only significant issue becomes the size of the ransom to be paid for total
peace." The policy goals of rule 23 have been served in such cases only if the defendant is
actually guilty, a fact known only to the parties who, as a typical condition of the settlement, are not talking.
Almond, Settling Rule 23 Class Actions at the PrecertificationStage: Is Notice Required?, 56
N.C.L. REV. 303, 305-06 (1978) (footnotes omitted), quoting Handler, The Shift From Substantive to ProceduralInnovations in Antitrust Suits-The Twenty-Third Annual Antitrust Review,
71 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 9 (1971).

4. See FED. R. CIv. P. 23(e); note 1 supra.
5. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1). The text of rule 23(c)(1) provides: "As soon as practicible after
the commencement of an action brought as a class action, the court shall determine by order
whether it is to be so maintained. An order under this subdivision may be conditioned, and
may be altered before the decision on the merits." Id. See 1966 Advisory Notes, supra note 2,
at 430. The Advisory Committee's notes make clear that, prior to the trial court's certification of
the suit as a class action, the suit's status is defeasible at best: "A negative determination [of
certification] means that the action should be stripped of its character as a class action." Id. See
also Shelton v. Pargo, 582 F.2d 1298, 1304 (4th Cir. 1978) (certification is the act which makes

(487)
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23(e) applies to cases where dismissal or settlement occurred prior to class
6
certification .
In PhiladelphiaElectric Co. v. Anaconda American Brass Co., 7 the first
case to address this issue, the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania held that suits brought as class actions were to be
presumed class actions for purposes of applying rule 23(e) during the interim
period between the filing of the complaint and the trial court's certification
of the class." Since PhiladelphiaElectric, courts have split and followed one
of four identifiable schools of thought in considering the applicability of rule
23(e) to dismissals and settlements of class actions not yet certified as such: 9
1) rule 23(e) should be strictly applied to dismissals and settlements of uncertified class actions; 10 2) rule 23(e) should be applied to such settlements
and dismissals but notice of the suit's termination need not be sent to all
putative class members; 11 3) rule 23(e) is not applicable at all to dismissals
and settlements of uncertified class actions; 12 and 4) rule 23(e) should be
applied according to the so-called functional approach under which a flexible
case-by-case analysis is utilized. 13
After examining these various approaches, this comment will suggest
that the functional approach best serves the purposes of rule 23(e) 14 because
1) it does not mandate a per se rule; 15 2) the flexibility of the approach best
serves to balance the interests of all parties to the class action; 16 and 3) a
the class a legal entity). See generally Comment, Continuation and Representation of Class
Actions Following Dismissal of the Class Representative, 1974 DUKE L.J. 573, 596 n.100.
6. See, e.g., In re Beef Industry Antitrust Litigation, 607 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1979); Shelton
v. Pargo, 582 F.2d 1298 (4th Cir. 1978); Weight Watchers Inc. v. Weight Watchers Int'l, 455
F.2d 770 (2d Cir. 1972); Magana v. Platzer Shipyard, Inc., 74 F.R.D. 61 (S.D. Texas 1977);
Rothman v. Gould, 52 F.R.D. 494 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); notes 45-117 and accompanying text infra.
In clarifying the issue, one commentator has observed:
The rule speaks to settlement of class actions. What, then, of settlements that are
negotiated at the precertification stage but nevertheless affect the rights of the class as a
whole? If the proposed settlement is directed at the claims of the class and if settlement
is to be accompanied by a voluntary dismissal with prejudice to class rights, then the
policy objectives of rule 23(e) can be only fulfilled by requiring notice to absentee class
members, even though the class has not yet been certified.
See Almond, supra note 3, at 311 (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted).
7. 42 F.R.D. 324 (E.D. Pa. 1967). For a discussion of Philadelphia Electric, see notes
33-43 and accompanying text infra.
8. 42 F.R.D. at 326.
9. See Almond, supra note 3, at 317-40.
10. See, e.g., Yaffe v. Detroit Steel Corp., 50 F.R.D. 481 (N.D. Ill. 1970). See also Almond, supra note 3, at 317; notes 46-50 and accompanying text supra.
11. See, e.g., Muntz v. Ohio Screw Prods., 61 F.R.D. 396 (N.D. Ohio 1973); Elias v.
National Car Rental Sys., Inc., 59 F.R.D. 276 (D. Minn. 1973). See also Almond, supra note 3,
at 321; notes 51-54 and accompanying text infra.
12. See, e.g., Weight Watchers, Inc. v. Weight Watchers Int'l. 455 F.2d 770 (2d Cir. 1972);
Rodgers v. United States Steel Corp., 70 F.R.D. 639 (W.D. Pa. 1976). See also Almond, supra
note 3, at 327; notes 55-57 and accompanying text infra.
13. See, e.g., Shelton v. Pargo, 582 F.2d 1298 (4th Cir. 1978); Magana v. Platzer Shipyard,
Inc., 74 F.R.D. 61 (S.D. Texas 1977). See also Almond, note 3 supra, at 337; notes 70-91 and
accompanying text infra.
14. See notes 118-53 and accompanying text infra.
15. See notes 121-53 and accompanying text infra.
16. See notes 120-22, 146-47 & 153 and accompanying text infra.
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majority of the courts recently deciding the issue 17 view the approach as
best suited to reconcile the policies of rule 23 with the public policy favoring
settlements of suits."8
II. BACKGROUND

A. Rule 23
As originally promulgated, rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure grouped into three categories the potential situations in which the class
action device might be utilized. 19 The so-called "true" category involved
0
"joint, common, or secondary" rights. 2

The "hybrid" category involved

"several" rights related to specific property. 21 Finally, the "spurious" category involved "several" rights affected by a common question and related to
common relief.2 2 Judgment in the first two categories would bind the class,
while judgment in the "spurious" category would extend only to the named
23
parties and the intervenors.
The Advisory Committee 24 discovered that although such categorization
was theoretically appealing, it was practically unworkable. 2 5 Following the

17. See notes 58-117 and accompanying text infra.
18. See notes 133-39 and accompanying text infra. One court has phrased the policy of
encouraging settlements as follows: "It hardly seems necessary to point out that there is an
overriding public interest in settling and quieting litigation. This is particularly true in class
action suits which are now an ever increasing burden to so many federal courts and which
frequently present serious problems of management and expense." Von Bronkhorst v. Safeco
Corp., 529 F.2d 943, 950 (9th Cir. 1976) (footnotes omitted).
19. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, 308 U.S. 689, 689-90 (1938). Rule 23 provided in pertinent part:
(a) REPRESENTATION. If persons constituting a class are so numerous as to make it
impracticable to bring them all before the court, such of them, one or more, as will fairly
insure the adequate representation of all may, on behalf of all, sue or be sued, when the
character of the right sought to be enforced for or against the class is
(1) joint, or common, or secondary in the sense that the owner of a primary right
refuses to enforce that right and a member of the class thereby becomes entitled to
enforce it;
(2) several, and the object of the action is the adjudication of claims which do or may
affect specific property involved in the action; or
(3) several, and there is a common question of law or fact affecting the several rights
and a common relief is sought.
id.
20. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1), 308 U.S. 689 (1938). See 1966 Advisory Notes, supra note 2, at
427.
21. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2), 308 U.S. 689 (1938). See 1966 Advisory Notes, supra note 2, at
427.
22. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3), 308 U.S. 689 (1938). See 1966 Advisory Notes, supra note 2, at
427.
23. 1966 Advisory Notes, supra note 2, at 427. For a discussion of how the original rule was
intended to be applied, see Moore, Federal Rules of Civil Procedures: Some Problems Raised by
the Preliminary Draft, 25 CEo. L.J. 551 (1937).
24. For a discussion of the Advisory Committee's origin and duties, see C. WRIGHT, LAW
OF FEDERAL COURTS 259-60 (2d ed. 1970). See generally Mars, Federal Procedural RuleMaking: The Program of the Judicial Conference, 47 A.B.A. J. 772 (1961).
25. 1966 Advisory Notes, supra note 2, at 427. The major criticism of the old rule was that
its description of the various categories was not clear enough to guide trial courts in deciding
whether a class action could he properly maintained. Id. For a discussion of the specific prob-
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recommendations of the Advisory Committee, the United States Supreme
Court, in 1966, promulgated an amendment to rule 2326 which deleted the
afirementioned categories and replaced them with a systen whereby class
allegations are re(Juired to be in compliance with specific prerequisites
enumerated in the rule. 27 Whether or not a class complaint satisfies the
prerequisites of the rule is a matter of preliminary decision by the trial
judge, 2 8 who is required by rule 23(c)(1) to determine "as soon as practicable
after the commencement of an action brought as a class action . . .whether
it is to be so maintained."29
Rule 23(e) was passed as part of the 1966 amendments and provides that
"[a] class action shall not be dismissed or compromised without the approval
of the court, and notice of the proposed dismissal or compromise shall be
given to all members of the class in such manner as the court directs.- 30

lems that induced the amendment to the original rule, see Z. CHAFEE, SOME PROBLEMS OF
EQUITY 245-46, 256-57 (1950); Kalven & Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the Class
Suit, 8 U. CHI. L. REv. 684 (1941); Developments in the Law-Multiparty Litigation in the
Federal Courts, 71 HARV. L. R:V. 874, 931 (1958); Comment, Federal Class Actions: A
Suggested Revision of Rule 23, 46 COLUM. L. RE''. 818 (1946).
26. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23. Rule 23, as amended, provides in pertinent part:
(a) Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more menmbers of a class May sue or be
sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (L)the class is so numerous that
joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact
common to
the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims
or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect
the interests of the class.
(b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a class action if the
prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition:
(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of the class
would create a risk of
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members of the
class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the
class, or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which would as a
practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the
adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests; or
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally
applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding
declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole; or
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members of the
class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class
action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the
controversy. The matters pertinent to the findings include: (A) the interest of members of
the class in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the
extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by or
against members of the class; (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the
litigation of the claims in the particular forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a class action.
Id. For the text of rule 23(e), see note I supra. For the text of rule 23(c)(1), see note 5 supra.
27. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a). For the text of the rule, see note 26 supra.
28. See 1966 Advisory Notes, supra note 2, at 429-30.
29. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1). For the text of rule 23(c)(1), see note 5 supra.
30. FED. R. CIv. P. 23(e). Although the Advisory Committee Notes give no express
rationale for the addition of subsection (e), it is submitted that the practical effect of the addition
necessarily inhibited abuse of the class action procedure by named or representative parties. See
note 3 and accompanying text supra. See also 1966 Advisory Notes, supra 2, at 431.
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The addition of rule 23(e) limited the possibility of abuse of the class action
device by preventing unsupervised settlements which had theretofore allowed named representatives to abandon the class after obtaining the higher
3
settlement that a class suit Would bring. 1
B. The Case Law
1. The Philadelphia Electric Case
In Philadelphia Electric,32 the plaintiffs filed class complaints alleging
violations of the antitrust laws. 33 After the question of class certification had
34
been scheduled to be argued, the parties reached a tentative settlement.
Although the court never conclusively resolved the question of the legal
status to be accorded to the precertification stage of a class action, 35 Judge
Fullam presumed the existence of a class in this suit for the purpose of
applying rule 23(e), 3 6 and ordered that notice be given to members of the
putative class. 3 7 However, since the class had not as yet been defined, such
notice could not, as a practical matter, be given. 38 Hence, the court ordered that approval of the proposed settlement be held in abeyance until
39
such time as the class was certified and proper notice of settlement given.
The court in Philadelphia Electric implied that plaintiffs should not be
allowed to enhance their bargaining power by alleging class considerations,
only to abandon the class after settlement of their personal claims. 40 The
31. See note 3 and accompanying text supra.
32. 42 F.R.D. 324 (E.D. Pa. 1967).
33. 42 F.R.D. at 325.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 326. Judge Fullam posed the following rhetorical question: "'Ifthe action is held to
be a class action, does it then become one as of the date of filing, or merely as of the date of
determination?" Id. In responding to this query, Judge Fullam merely opined that "[tihe use of
the word 'maintained' in 23(c)(1) is some indication that the court is expected to determine what
the lawsuit has always been, not what it is about to become." Id.
36. Id. In setting forth this presumption, Judge Fullam stated:
It is my opinion that whatever uncertainties exist as to the precise status of an action
brought as a class action, during the interim between filing and the 23(c)(1) determination
by the court, it must be assumed to be a class action for purposes of dismissal or compromise under 23(e) unless and until a contrary determination is made under 23(c)(1).
Id.
37. Id. at 328.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. Two aspects of the court's opinion lead to this implication. First, the proposed settlement was to be with prejudice, thereby purportedly foreclosing the opportunity of absentee
class members to bring their own individual suits. Id. at 327. Second, the class at the time of
settlement was not ascertainable. id. at 326.
Notwithstanding what the court perceived to be an otherwise reasonable settlement, it
opted to preserve the absentee class members' right to be heard, thus preserving the ongoing
fiduciary relationship between the named representative and the class. Id. at 328 n.2. It is thus
submitted that the court must have intended to establish a prophylactic rule to prevent abuse of
class actions for otherwise there would have been no reason on the facts of this case not to
approve settlement.
It should be noted that since the proposed dismissal was to be with prejudice as to absentee class members, id. at 327, due process principles may well have compelled that notice be
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court also indicated that before it exercises its approval power under rule
23(e), it should be informed of the nature of the claims, class or individual,
being presented. 41 It should be noted, however, that in light of the actual
disposition of the case in Philadelphia Electric, the court's construction of
rule 23(e) was largely by way of dicta, 42 for once the class is certified as the
court presumed it would be, rule 2 3(e) would expressly apply, thereby obviating the need to apply the rule to the precertification area. 43 Numerous
courts have nevertheless utilized the broad language of Philadelphia Electric
44
2
to justify the application of rule 3(e) to precertification cases.
2. The Early Post-Philadelphia Electric Cases
In cases decided after PhiladelphiaElectric, the courts divided in their
approaches to the applicability of rule 23(e) to cases not yet certified as class
actions. 45 In Yaffe v. Detroit Steel Corp. 46 and in Rothman v. Gould, 47 for
example, the district courts simply applied rule 23(e), even though class action certification had not yet occurred, and ordered notice to be sent to all
putative class members. 48 These courts justified this per se approach in part
by focusing on the possibility that the potential class members may have
49
been induced not to bring their own suits by the filing of the class action.

given regardless of the applicability of rule 23(e). See generally Note, Due Process Rights of
Absentees in Title
VII Class Actions-The Myth of Homogeneity of Interest, 59 B.U.L. REv. 661
(1979).
41. 42 F.R.D. at 328.
42. Id.The actual disposition of the case was a stay of the motion fbr court approval of the
settlement under rule 2 3 (e). Id.
43. See Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975). Concerning the effect of class certification, the
Sosna Court stated: "'When the District Court certified the propriety of the class action, the
class of unnamed persons described in the certification acquired a legal status separate from the
interest asserted by appellant." Id. at 399. The Court further noted that -[o]nce the suit is
certified as a class action, it may not be settled or dismissed without the approval of the court.'"
Id. n.8.
44. See, e.g., Muntz v. Ohio Screw Prods., 61 F.R.D. 396 (N.D. Ohio 1973); Elias v.
National Car Rental Sys., Inc., 59 F.R.D. 276 (D. Minn. 1973); notes 51-54 and accompanying
text infra.
45. See notes 46-101 and accompanying text infra.
46. 50 F.R.D. 481 (N.D. I11.
1970).
47. 52 F.R.D. 494 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
48. Rothman v. Gould, 52 F.R.D. at 496; Yaffe v. Detroit Steel Corp., 50 F.R.D. at 483.
See generally Almond, supra note 3, at 317-21.
49. See Rothman v.Gould, 52 F.R.D. at 496; Yaffe v. Detroit Steel Corp., 50 F.R.D. at
483. In Yaffe, the court declared:
In the first instance, permitting this amendment [to delete class action allegations]
might well prejudice the rights of class members. This lawsuit, and the acquisition it
challenges, have received publicity in the financial press and, at least one occasion, counsel for plaintiffs issued a press release which found its way into the Wall Street Journal.
Moreover, counsel for plaintiffs participated in drawing up proxy materials sent to Detroit
Steel shareholders which mentioned that this lawsuit was filed as a class action. It is
altogether possible, therefore, that some class members, choosing to rely on this lawsuit
as their means of redress, have decided not to file separate actions. Consequently, permitting this amendment without notice could result in an unwitting forfeiture of their
rights.
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The courts reasoned that if such inducement occurred and no notice of the
settlement was provided, putative class members could, depending upon the
50
statute of limitations, be left without a cause of action.
A second line of cases have followed the dicta in Philadelphia Electric
which suggested that a court should presume that rule 2 3 (e) applies "until
and unless" the certification issue is decided negatively. 5' These cases recognize, as a theoretical matter, that rule 23(e) applies to precertification
cases; nevertheless, the impact of this approach is avoided by requiring an
52
expedited preliminary ruling on the certification issue under rule 23(c)(1).

50. See Rothman v. Gould, 52 F.R.D. at 495; Yaffe v. Detroit Steel Corp., 50 F.R.D. at
483. See also Monarch Asphalt Sales Co. v. Wilshire Oil Co., 511 F.2d 1073, 1079 (10th Cir.
1975) (motion to intervene denied because original statute of limitations had run, notwithstanding plaintiffs' claim that they were misled by the filing of an action whose class status was
subsequently denied).
In Rothman and Yaffe, the applicable statutes of limitations would have run out in precisely
the same manner as the scenario in Philadelphia Electric had notice not been ordered prior to
approval of settlement. See Rothman v. Gould, 52 F.R.D. at 496; Yaffe v. Detroit Steel Corp.,
50 F.R.D. at 483; notes 33-44 and accompanying text supra. However, in light of the United
States Supreme Court decision in American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538 (1973),
the running of statutes of limitations has become a far less prominent concern. That case held
that the applicable statute of limitations is tolled, as to putative class members, upon the filing
of the class action, and remains tolled until certification of the class is denied. Id. at 766. It is
thus suggested that American Pipe has seriously undermined the persuasiveness of the reliance
rationale of Yaffe and Rothman, because if the statute of limitations is tolled during the pendency
of certification proceedings, absentee class members with no knowledge of the existence of such
proceedings are in no worse position than they would have been had no class action been
brought.
Moreover, use of this reliance rationale has been criticized recently by at least one commentator:
The policy goals stated by the district courts that have required notice hardly justify
this judge-made extension of rule 23(e). The cases usually speak of reliance of absentee
members upon the purported "class action" and stress that rule 23(e), if applied in the
individual pre-certification settlement context, will somehow curtail abuse of rule 23 by
plaintiffs and their attorneys. Little, if any, concern is expressed in any of the cases for
the defendant's plight. The defendant, who is the party directly abused by the plaintiff's
machinations, should not, having settled with the plaintiff, be required to endure additional manhandling.
Almond, supra note 3, at 315-16 (footnotes omitted). Cf. Duncan v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber
Co., 66 F.R.D. 615, 616 (E.D. Wis. 1975) (precertification notice of settlement held mandatory
under rule 23(e), although no rationale was provided to support this per se approach).
It should be noted, however, that even after the Supreme Court's decision in American
Pipe there remained some confusion on the issue of when the statute started running again. The
Court's decision has, however, been construed to mean that upon denial of certification and
notice thereof, the original statute of limitations would begin to run once more. See United
Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U.S. 385, 391 (1977).
51. See, e.g., Muntz v. Ohio Screw Prods., 61 F.R.D. 396, 399 (N.D. Ohio 1973) (court
denied class status on failure to satisfy numerosity requirement of rule 23(a)(1), and then approved individual settlement with named representative); Elias v. National Car Rental Sys.,
Inc., 59 F.R.D. 276, 277 (D. Minn. 1973) (court found inadequate representation as grounds for
denying class status and then approved settlement with named representatives without notice to
others). See generally Almond, supra note 3, at 321-27; note 5 and accompanying text supra.
52. Muntz v. Ohio Screw Prods., 61 F.R.D. 396 (N.D. Ohio 1973); Elias v. National Car
Rental Sys., Inc., 59 F.R.D. 276 (D. Minn. 1973). The approach taken in these cases is distinct
from that relied upon in Yaffe and Rothman. Cf. notes 46-50 and accompanying text supra.
Under the Muntz and Elias approach, the courts assume that the class could not be certified,
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If the certification is denied, the presumed applicability of rule 2 3(e) has
been rebutted and no notice is ordered.53 If the preliminary finding is that
54
the class is viable, rule 23(e) applies on its face.

Still, in a third line of cases, courts have refused to apply rule 23(e) to

proposed settlements with individual members of a class when such settlements have no effect upon the rights of other class members. 55 Such cases
generally refer to attempts at settlement with individual class members other
than the named representatives. 56 According to the rationale of these cases,
defendants can settle with individual members of putative classes unencumbered by the notice and approval requirements of rule 23(e), even though
the effect of this practice may be to destroy the numerosity requirement of
57
rule 23(a)(1).

largely because named representatives make no attempt to adduce evidence of class viability.

See, e.g., Muntz v. Ohio Screw Prods., 61 F.R.D. at 399; Elias v. National Car Rental Sys.,
Inc., 59 F.R.D. at 277. It is submitted that tinder these circumstances there is no possibility of
prejudice to class members in terms of being bound to an unfair settlement because, in the
absence of a viable class, each class member is free to litigate on his own. Nevertheless, the
courts which use this approach tend to ignore their role as preventors of abuse of the class
action device, since denial of class action status gives the named representative the benefit of an
enhanced settlement value which exists by virtue of the mere allegation of entitlement to
class-wide relief in the original complaint. See generally Almond, supra note 3, at 323, 324.
Moreover, it is suggested that the expedited certification approach would force courts to expedite rule 23(c)(1) motions merely to approve settlements. One commentator has severely
criticized this approach:
Philadelphia Electric cannot be read to support the requirement of a 2 3 (Q)(1) hearing
in every case. The court expressly limited its language so as to presume the validity of the
class action only for restricted purposes. The only reason a 23(c)(1) determination occurred
in this case was that considerations of due process required notice to be given members of
the class under rule 23(e) because they would be bound by the consequences of the
settlement. These due process considerations are absent where the dismissal of the action
would not foreclose the class from seeking further relief. Therefore, a 23(c)(1) determination would not be an essential exercise in those situations.
Comment, supra note 6, at 595 (footnotes omitted).
53. See note 52 and accompanying text supra. See also note I and accompanying text supra.
54. See notes 51-52 and accompanying text supra.
55. See, e.g., Weight Watchers, Inc. v. Weight Watchers Int'l, 455 F.2d 770 (2d Cir. 1972);
Rodgers v. United States Steel Corp., 70 F.R.D. 639 (W.D. Pa. 1976). See generally Almond,
supra note 3, at 327-31.
56. See, e.g., Rodgers v. United States Steel Corp., 70 F.R.D. 639 (W.D. Pa. 1976),
Nesenoff v. Muten, 67 F.R.D. 500 (E.D.N.Y. 1974). See also Almond, supra note 3, at 328.
The Rodgers Court noted that the rationale underlying notice and approval requirements are
inapposite to proposed settlements with individual class members:
By its terms, Rule 23(e) applies and is limited to the dismissal or compromise of a
class action itself . . . where application of its strictures is necessary to protect the rights
of absentee or nonparty class members who may be bound or affected by a settlement of
their claims by their class representatives . . . . In contrast, the Rule does not attach to
direct settlements with individual class members which have no effect upon the rights of
others.
70 F.R.D. at 642 (emphasis in original) (citations and footnote omitted).
57. See, e.g., Weight Watchers, Inc. v. Weight Watchers Int'l, 455 F.2d 770, 775 (2d Cir.
1972)(dicta). For the text of rule 23(a)(1), see note 26 supra. It should be noted that rule 23(e)
has also been held to be inapplicable when the settlement or dismissal is involuntary or
achieved by operation of law. See Burgener v. California Adult Auth., 407 F. Supp. 555, 560
(N.D. Cal. 1976) (dismissal of plaintiff's claims on the merits is an involuntary dismissal and not
subject to rule 23(e)).
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III. THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH
A. Notice Requirement
In what must be considered the modern trend, 58 some courts have eschewed the application of the aforementioned categorical approaches and
opted instead to order rule 23(e) notice only when warranted by the facts of
an individual case. 5 9 One of the first cases to recognize the utility of the
so-called functional approach in precertification cases was Magana v. Platzer
Shipyard, Inc.,60 where the named plaintiffs filed a class action in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas alleging dis-

crimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.61 The
suit had not yet been certified as a class action when a settlement was proposed between the defendant and the named plaintiffs. 62

cases which did not utilize the functional approach,

63

Relying upon two

the court declared that

58. See notes 60-61, 67 & 70 and accompanying text infra.
59. See, e.g., Shelton v. Pargo, 582 F.2d 1298 (4th Cir. 1978); Magana v. Platzer Shipyard,
Inc., 74 F.R.D. 61 (S.D. Tex. 1977); Johnson v. Wentz Equip. Co., 18 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
1499 (D. Kan. 1977). One commentator has recognized the judicial acceptance of the functional
approach, stating:
The applicability of Rule 23(e) between the time the action is brought and the date of
certification of the class has been raised in several cases. Courts have recognized that in
order to effectuate the purpose of Rule 23(e), it must apply from the commencement of an
action filed as a class action until such time as there is a ruling denying the class action ....
...However, it is generally recognized that class notice may properly be waived in
the court's discretion without first denying the class aspects, provided the court determines that no prejudice to the class will result. This is the preferable procedure because
the court directly focuses on possible class prejudice indeciding whether class notice is
required.
3 H. NEVBERG, CLASS ACTIONS §§ 4920, 4960, at 404, 407 (1977) (emphasis added) (footnotes
omitted). See also Wheeler, Predisomissal Notice and Statutes of Limitations in Federal Class
Actions After American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah, 48 S. CAL. L. REV. 771, 807 (1975).
60. 74 F.R.D. 61 (S.D. Texas 1977).
61. Id. at 62. See 42 U.S.C. 2000e (1976).
62. 74 F.R.D. at 64.
63. Id. at 67, citing Berse v. Berman, 60 F.R.D. 414 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) and Elias v. National
Car Rental Sys., Inc., 59 F.R.D. 276 (D. Minn. 1973). It is suggested that Berse and Elias can
more properly be ciassified as cases which have espoused one of the three categorical approaches outlined above. See notes 46-54 and accompanying text supra.
In adopting the "reliance approach," see notes 47-51 and accompanying text supra, the
Berse court stated that if the putative class members could possibly have actual knowledge of
the suit's class allegations, it would be presumed that the putative members relied upon this
suit in not filing their own actions. 60 F.R.D. at 416. The court ruled that, in light of this
presumed reliance, it would require notice to be given when the class action allegations are
struck following a defendant's offer of settlement. Id. Noting that the class allegations in this
suit were struck because plaintiffs could not meet the rule's prerequisites to class certification,
the Berse court found that notice was not required. Id. at 417. Although the Berse court's
consideration of several factors gave it the appearance of the functional approach, it is contended that the court was working within the framework of the "reliance approach." This conclusion is reached because under the theory of the functional approach, reliance by putative
class members would not ordinarily be presumed; rather, it would have to be proven in some
manner, possibly by the existence of a small percentage of motions to intervene, or by affidavits
of putative class members, or by any other reasonable means of establishing reliance. See Almond, supra note 3, at 337.
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a case-by-case analysis was necessary to protect "the possible reliance interest of putative class members." 64 Finding that the reliance interest
among the absent class members varied with the members' actual knowledge
of the existence of the suit, 65 the court concluded that notice is required
only when it is shown that putative class members have actually relied upon
66
the plaintiff's class action allegations.
Similarly, in Johnson v. Wentz Equipment Co.,67 a federal district court
in Kansas viewed the reliance interest to be the touchstone of the notice
requirement of rule 23(e) and refused to order notice in the absence of a
showing of actual reliance by putative class members. 68 The Wentz court
added, however, that rule 2 3(e) notice would also be ordered upon an alternative showing of abuse of the class action device by the named representa69
tives.
The most explicit and authoritative exposition of the functional approach
came in Shelton v. Pargo.70 where the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit reversed a district court's ruling that rule 23(e) mandated
notice of a stipulated dismissal of an uncertified class action. 71 Although the
Fourth Circuit rejected the presumption that rule 23(e) applies per se to any
action in which there are class action allegations in the complaint, 72 it did
not abandon the concept that the judiciary must protect the integrity of the
class action device. 73 Rather, the court emphasized that a named representative of a class has a fiduciary obligation to putative class members to prosecute the suit vigorously. 74 Thus, in order to guard against potential abuse of
the class action device by named representatives, 7 the Fourth Circuit took
the view that district courts have the power to supervise and regulate class

It is also suggested that the Elias court did not follow the functional approach, but rather
followed that line of cases using expedited preliminary decisions on class certification. See 59
F.R.D. at 277; notes 51-54 and accompanying text supra. In Elias, the court held that the
named representative's desire to withdraw was a sufficient ground to deny class certification
under rule 23(a)(4). 59 F.R.D. at 277.
64. 74 F.H.D. at 70.
65. id.
66. Id. The court noted that such a showing could be made, for example, where substantial
publicity has been given to the filing of the class suit. Id.
67. 18 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1499 (D. Kan. 1977).
68. Id. at 1503.
69. Id. The Wentz court stated:
Additional to the goal of protecting the class is the Court's goal of preventing abuse
of the class action device by judicial approval of pre-certified settlements.
The classic example of such abuse is the use by a plaintiff class's attorney of class
action allegations as a bargaining chip to produce settlement offers which would be unwarranted by the individual claims of the representative plaintiffs.
Id. at 1502.
70. 582 F.2d 1298 (4th Cir. 1978).
71. Id. at 1316.
72. Id. at 1303.
73. ld.
74. Id. at 1305.
75. For a description of the manner in which the class action device may be abused by
named representatives, see notes 3 & 31 and accompanying text supra.
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action suits, including the power to order notice to putative class members,
77
76
which is derived not only from rule 23(e) but from rule 23(d) as well.
By grounding the power to order notice partly upon rule 23(d), the
Shelton court implied that notice could be ordered to curb abuse at any
stage of the proceedings, including before class certification, without having
to rely upon rule 23(e).7 8 The court noted that tinder this approach, notice
to putative class members prior to certification would not be mandatory, as
rule 23(e) on its face purports to make it, 7 9 but would instead be a discretionary power to be used to curb abuse and preserve the integrity of the class
action device. 80

76. 582 F.2d at 1306. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(d). The text of rule 23(d) provides:
(d) Orders in conduct of actions.
In the conduct of actions to which this rule applies, the court may make appropriate
orders:
(1) determining the course of proceedings or prescribing measures to prevent undue repetition or complication in the presentation of evidence or argument; (2) requiring, for
the protection of the members of the class or otherwise for the fair conduct of the action,
that notice b given in such manner as the court may direct to some or all of the members of any step in the action, or of the proposed extent of the judgment, or of the
opportunity of members to signify whether they consider the representation fair and
adequate, to intervene and present claims or defenses, or otherwise to come into the
action; (3) imposing conditions on the representative parties or on intervenors; (4) requiring that the pleadings be amended to eliminate therefrom allegations as to representation
of absent persons, and that the action proceed accordingly; (5) dealing with similar procedural matters. The orders may be combined with an order under Rule 16, and may be
altered or amended as may be desirable from time to time.
Id.
77. 582 F.2d at 1309.
78. Id. at 1306. The'court stated:
[T]he District Court should have both the power and the duty, in view of its supervisory
power over and its special responsibility in actions brought as class actions, as set forth in
23(d), to see that the representative party does nothing .... in derogation of the fiduciary
responsibility he has assumed, which will prejudice unfairly the members of the class he
seeks to represent. Apart, then, from the question whether 23(e) provides authority for
judicial control over settlements and compromises by representative parties or not, the
District Court would appear to have an ample arsenal to checkmate any abuse of the class
action procedure, if unreasonable prejudice to absentee class members would result, irrespective of the time when the abuse arises.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
79. Id. at 1310. For a discussion of how some courts have interpreted rule 23(e) to require
mandatory precertification notice, see notes 46-54 and accompanying text supra.
80. 582 F.2d at 1310-11. The functional approach adopted by the Shelton court vindicates
the prophecy of one notable commentator:
Within the confines of the existing rule . .. the limited problems involving individual
settlements of alleged class actions can be dealt with effectively. Any solution to the
problems [of precertification settlements] must take several factors into account: (1) Class
action "strike suits," prefiling abuse, class "sell-outs" and other abuses of rule 23 must be
avoided and effectively deterred; (2) the interests of the putative class must be protected
against settlement, dismissals or compromises that are binding upon them or otherwise
prejudice their rights; (3) reliance by nonparty class members upon alleged class actions
at the precertification stage must be prevented; and (4) the courts must be fair to parties
who wish to settle individual claims at the precertification stage. This means rejection of
procedures and proceedings that inject uncalled-for delays, expense and obstructions into
the settlement process when the rights of others cannot reasonably be regarded as at
stake.
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Turning to the other approaches to this issue, the Shelton court rejected
the view that Philadelphia Electric 81 mandated a determination of certification and the ordering of notice as a precondition to settlement. 8 2 The court
distinguished Philadelphia Electric by noting that due process considerations
controlled that case since absent class members were thought to be bound by
8 3
the settlement.
Absent the countervailing due process considerations present in
PhiladelphiaElectric, the Shelton court found that the necessity of conducting a precertification hearing to determine the merits of sending notice to
putative class members is a matter of discretion for the trial judge. 84 The
court also rejected both the view that rule 23(e) mandates notice in precertification dismissals and the view that such precertification dismissals cannot
be approved without notice unless a negative determination has been made
on the certification issue . 5 Such approaches, according to the court, would
86
be too mechanical and would unreasonably inhibit voluntary settlements.
It should be noted that as a result of its reliance upon rule 23(d), the
Shelton court's decision is tantamount to a holding that rule 23(e), at least
with respect to notice, does not apply in the precertification context.8 7 The
Fourth Circuit would not, however, preclude a district court from certifying
a class expeditiously and then applying rule 23(e),18 nor would it preclude
notice, from being ordered under the court's general authority to regulate the
conduct of class actions under rule 23(d).8 9

Thus, while the Shelton court

Rule 23(e) notice is not a panacea. In most precertification individual settlements, it
is not even a good idea. The "prevention of abuse" rationale is a classic example of too
little, too late, and breeds its own peculiar brand of prefiling abuse. The "reliance interest" theory ignores the realities of modern legal practice: rarely does anyone rely upon
an uncertified class action and gratuitous, speculative presumptions to the contrary by
federal district judges must be rejected as false. Whenever reliance is a factor, it is a
demonstrable one; in the absence of evidence of such reliance, the court's conscience
ought not be troubled.
Almond, supra note 3, at 337.
81. See notes 33-43 and accompanying text supra.
82. 582 F.2d at 1309.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. 1d. at 1308-11.
87. It is unclear whether the court was relying solely upon rule 23(d) in its decision or
whether it used rule 23(d) merely as an alternative basis for allowing the trial court discretion to
order that notice be given. There is, however, language in the opinion to indicate that the first
interpretation is correct:
We are convinced . . . that Professor Wheeler is more accurate in his reading of Sosna,
particularly in light of later cases pointing in the same direction, that 23(e) applies only to
the dismissal of the class action. He has said that "[t]he clear implication of the italicized
statement (i.e., 'Once the suit is certified as a class action, it may not be dismissed without the approval of the court') is that the requirement of court approval for settlement or
dismissal embodied in rule 23(e) does not apply until an action has been certified as a
class action."
Id. at 1304 (footnote omitted). For the quote from Sosna, see note 43 supra. For Professor
Wheeler's analysis, see Wheeler, supra note 59, at 775.
88. See 582 F.2d at 1316.
89. Id. at 1309.
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dispelled the notion that application of rule 23(e) is mandatory in
precertification cases, 90 it simultaneously reserved the power of the trial

court to order notice or to take other appropriate measures to safeguard the
91
potential class members against abuse by the named representatives.
Such a flexible approach has been vindicated by recent court decisions
dealing with the precertification issue and, although the precedent is sparse,
a trend favoring application of the functional approach is clear. 92 For example, in Jaen v. New York Telephone Co., 9 3 the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York held that Shelton controlled the issue
of whether precertification notice must be given, and cited Shelton with approval for the proposition that "a District Court is not automatically obligated to order notice to all putative class members under the terms of [rule]
23(e)." 94

The most recent and most liberal exposition of the functional approach
to date was set forth in In re Beef Industry Antitrust Litigation, 95 where the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit endorsed the so-called
"temporary settlement class" technique 96 as a means to achieve prompt approval of settlements. 97 While at first blush it appears that this technique
merely represents a modified form of the expedited rule 23(c)(1) procedure
which pre-Shelton courts had used to circumvent rule 23(e), 98 the Fifth Circuit's opinion indicates that this is not the case. Rather, the court found that
the authority to use this technique is implicit in the functional approach
which not only permits the exercise of discretion in determining whether

90. Id. at 1315.
91. See id.
92. See, e.g., In re Beef Indus. Antitrust Litigation, 607 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1979); Jaen v.
New York Tel. Co., 81 F.R.D. 696 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
93. 81 F.R.D. 696 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
94. Id. at 697, quoting Shelton v. Pargo, 582 F.2d at 1315.
95. 607 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1979).
96. Id. at 173. A temporary settlement class is an innovative technique designed to alleviate
the practical problems of ordering notice in a precertification context to a class that has not as
yet been ascertained. Id. at 177. Under this approach, a class, presumably smaller than the
class might have been if actual certification had been accomplished, is created solely for the
purpose of sending rule 23(e) notice. Id. The use of this technique has not been universally
approved. See, e.g., MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 1.46, at 88 (1978); Miller, An Overview of Federal Class Actions: Past, Present, and Future, 4 JUST. SYs. J. 197 (1979). Indeed,
one commentator has stated:
I have become convinced in recent years that there really is a serious problem: prior to
certification, the judge does not have enough information to do a completely effective job
under Rule 23(e).
What is clear is that a judge is well advised to demand a full presentation on all of
those aspects of certification bearing on adequacy of representation and class homogeny if
the court is going to consider a proposed settlement prior to formal certification. Ironically, if he does, he mnight as well complete the Rule 23(c)(1) process.
Id. at 216 (emphasis added). Nevertheless, the following cases have utilized a temporary settlement class: Girsch v. Jepson, 521 F.2d 153 (3d Cir. 1975); Grunin v. International House of
Pancakes, 513 F.2d 114 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 864 (1975); Greenfield v. Villager
Indus. Inc., 483 F.2d 824 (3d Cir. 1973).
97. 607 F.2d at 177.
98. See notes 51-54 and accompanying text supra.
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rule 23(e) notice should be ordered, 99 but also allows all methods of dealing
with precertification settlement cases, including expedited certification procedure where it is called for. 00 Thus, the Fifth Circuit in In re Beef Antitrust
Litigation held that in the absence of abuse of the class action device-and
where the settlement is otherwise fair and reasonable-creation of a temporary settlement class is within the discretion of the trial judge. 10 '
B. Approval Requirements
Thus far, discussion of the functional approach has emphasized the
notice requirements of rule 23(e) in class actions not yet certified as
such. 10 2 The language of rule 23(e), however, not only mandates notice; it
also requires court approval of settlements. 10 3 As was true when the rule's
notice requirements were being considered, an analysis of the judicial approval aspect of rule 23(e) must begin with a discussion of Philadelphfa Elec10 4

tric.

The Philadelphia Electric court required approval of the settlement of
the alleged class action to be held in abeyance until 1) the trial court made a
certification decision under rule 23(c)(1); 105 and 2) if a class was certified,
notice was given to class members.' 0 6 Thus, notwithstanding its dicta which
10 7
indicated that rule 23(e) is to be applied in the precertification context,
the court's holding can only be construed as applying to the notice aspect of
the rule since, after certification, rule 23(e) applies facially, whereas prior to
such certification, the decision on approval of the settlement is delayed pursuant to the abeyance procedure. 10 8
Nevertheless, in Magana v. Platzer Shipyard, Inc., 10 9 the district court
apparently relied upon the broad language of PhiladelphiaElectric 11o in presuming the validity of a class prior to actual certification so as to require
99. 607 F.2d at 177, quoting 3 H. NEWBERG, supra note 59, § 5570c, at 476. See notes
79-80 and accompanying text supra.
100. 607 F.2d at 177. See note 88 and accompanying text supra. It is submitted that such a
procedure might be authorized under the broad authority granted trial judges under rule
23(d)(2). The use of this authority, however, would be discretionary as contradistinct from the
mandatory language of rule 23(c)(1). It is suggested that the major innovation in the Fifth Circuit's view is its perception that the functional approach neither mandates the imposition of an
expedited certification procedure nor precludes such a procedure from being implemented in
proper cases.
101. 607 F.2d at 180.
102. See notes 58-101 and accompanying text supra.
103. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e). For the text of rule 23(e), see note I supra.
104. For a discussion of Philadelphia Electric, see notes 32-43 and accompanying text supra.
105. For the text of rule 23(c)(1), see note 5 and accompanying text supra.
106. 42 F.R.D. at 328.
107. Id. at 327. The court stated in dicta that "[u]nder any view of the matter, ...
the
proposed settlements must be regarded as attempting to compromise the claims of the class, not
just the named plaintiffs. Rule 23(e) clearly applies to this situation .
Id.
108. Id. at 328. See notes 42-43 and accompanying text supra.
109. 74 F.R.D. 61 (S.D. Texas 1977). For a discussion of the Magana court's adoption of the
functional approach with respect to the notice requirements, see notes 60-65 and accompanying
text supra.
110. See note 105 and accompanying text supra.
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court approval of a settlement.'1 1 Unlike Philadelphia Electric, however,
112
the Magana court did not require mandatory notice under rule 23(e).
The Magana court thus found that approval of a precertification settlement
could be obtained in certain cases without first notifying all putative class
13
members. 1
Similarly, in Shelton v. Pargo,114 the Fourth Circuit supported a bifurcated interpretation of the applicability of rule 23(e) in the precertification
context. 115 Notwithstanding the fact that the language of the rule is mandatory with respect to both elements, the Shelton court relied upon the following alternative theories to justify its finding that the rule's notice requirements were discretionary while its approval requirements were mandatory:
1) that rule 23(e) is "flexible" and should not be interpreted literally; 116 and
2) that although rule 23(d) gives the court the power to order notice where
necessary to protect abuse of the class action device, unless the court retains
power under rule 23(e) to approve or disapprove settlements, the effectiveness of a court's exercise of its rule 23(d) powers would be seriously undermined.117

111. 74 F.R.D. at 66. It should be noted that Magana was decided by the same court which
opted to apply the functional approach to the notice requirement of'rule 23(e) in the precertification context. Id. at 70. Finding, however, that a prophylactic rule should apply with
respect to the approval requirement of rule 23(e), the court stated:
[Blecause the abuses which rule 23(e) is designed to combat can occur prior to class
certification, this Court holds that rule 23(e) approval must be obtained for the proposed
settlement of a named plaintiff's claim when the plaintiff has purported to represent a
class that he now seeks to dismiss.
Id. at 66. (emphasis added). Although this bifurcated approach to the inapplicability of rule 23(e)
in the precertification context is seemingly inconsistent, it is submitted that such treatment can
be justified on the grounds that 1) the language of rule 23(e) expressly supports this view; and 2)
the policy goal of flexibility in applying the rule requires such an approach. See notes 115-17 &
120 and accompanying text infra.
112. Compare Magana v. Platzer Shipyard, Inc., 74 F.R.D. at 66 with Philadelphia Electric
Co. v. Anaconda American Brass Co., 42 F.R.D. at 328.
113. 74 F.R.D. at 66.
114. 582 F.2d 1298 (4th Cir. 1978). For a discussion of Shelton, see notes 70-91 and accompanying text supra.
115. 582 F.2d at 1310. The Shelton court quoted with approval the following passage from
Professor Newberg's work, Class Actions:
The language of rule 23(e) suggests that both court aproval and notice are mandatory
on dismissal or compromise of a class suit [with respect to precertification situations], and
some courts have so held. However, on closer analysis, notice is not mandatory in all
instances, but "shall be given to all members of the class in such manner as the court
directs." Broadly interpreted, this language is sufficiently flexible to pennit the court to
approve a dismissal, but to determine that no notice at all is required, where the dismissal will not result in any prejudice to the class.
Id. (emphasis added), quoting H. NEWBERG, supra note 58, § 4950, at 405-06 quoting FED. R.
Civ. P. 23(e).
116. 582 F.2d at 1310-11.
117. Id. at 1306, 1311. See also Developments in the Law-Class Actions, 89 HARV. L. REv.
1318, 1542 n.32 [hereinafter cited as Developments].
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CASE FOR THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH

It is submitted that the functional approach is best suited for attaining
the general goals of amended rule 23118 and for reconciling the need to
protect putative class members with the public policy of encouraging settlements. 119 Amended rule 23 is designed to provide and encourage flexibility
in dealing with the unique problems generated by the use of the class action
device. 120 The functional approach to precertification settlements obviates
the necessity for a strict, mechanical reading of rule 23(e) because the purposes underlying rule 23 can be effectuated by other sources, including rule
23(d), which do not contain language that appears to be mandatory.121 It is
therefore submitted that rule 23(e) ought not to be read literally, but liberally, with an eye towards the "mischief" it is designed to prevent.122
Under the other approaches courts have utilized in construing the
applicability of rule 23(e) in the precertification context, 123 it is submitted
that at least one of the two competing policy goals -protection of the class
action device 124 or settlement of complex litigation 125 -must be sacrificed.
If notice is deemed mandatory under rule 23(e) irrespective of either the
actual need to inform putative class members who may have relied upon the
filing of the suit or the absence of abuse by named representatives, 126 then
it is suggested that the unnecessary notice requirement can only have the
effect of inhibiting the settlement of suits.127
Similarly, if an expedited decision on the class certification issue is required, 128 protection of the integrity of the class action device may be diminished because once a negative determination is made, the court loses all
power to supervise the suit under rule 23.129 If such a determination is
118. See notes 3 & 31 and accompanying text supra.
119. See note 18 and accompanying text supra.
120. See geneerally MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 1.46 (1978). The Manual notes that
courts are expected to develop new methods of employing amended rule 23. Id. § 1.46, at 88.
121. See Shelton v. Pargo, 582 F.2d 1298 (4th Cir. 1978); notes 70-91 and accompanying text
srI)ra; notes 133-39 and accompanying text infra.
122. See notes 115-16 and accompanying text supra; notes 135-36 and accompanying text
infra.
123. See notes 45-57 and accompanying text supra.
124. For a discussion of this policy, see H. NEWBERG, supra note 59 § 4950, at 405; notes 3
& 31 an(l accompanying text supra.
125. For judicial recognition of this policy goal, see Shelton v. Pargo, 582 F.2d at 1311; Van
Bronkhorst v. Safeco Corp., 529 F.2d 943, 950 (9th Cir. 1972); note 18 and accompanying text
su pra.
126. See notes 46-50 and accompanying text supra.
127. See, e.g., Rothman v. Gould, 52 F.R.D. 494 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). In Rothiano, the named
representative and the defendants reached a settlement after the certification issue had been
dormant for more than two years. Id. at 495. Upon plaintiff's motion to strike the class allegations from the complaint, the judge ordered notice to he sent to the putative class members
pursuant to rule 23(e). Id. at 496. When informed of the court's ruling, the defendants promptly
withdrew their settlement offer rather than risk the possibility of facing innumerable separate suits
and motions to intervene. Id. at 497. Thus, as these facts indicate, if settlement with named
representatives cannot end the litigation, a defendant's incentive to settle will be eflectively
destroyed. See also notes 47-50 and accompanying text supra.
128. See notes 51-54 and accompanying text supra.
129. See note 5 and accompanying text supra; note 132 infra.
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made solely to avoid imposing the notice requirement of rule 2 3(e), the
courts will have effectively handcuffed themselves since any time a named
representative desires to settle, he can contend that class certification should
be denied due to a lack of adequate representation under rule 23(a)(4).130
While a notice order may or may not be desirable in a given case,13 1 courts
avoiding such orders by expeditiously denying class certification have, it is
submitted, deprived themselves of the means to insure fairness of the settlement to the class through the approval requirement of rule 23(e).132
In contrast to these approaches, it is suggested that the functional approach avoids these pitfalls. The use of this analysis obviates the necessity of
grounding a notice order solely upon rule 2 3(e) because it recognizes that
even if a precertification dismissal or settlement is outside the scope of rule
23(e), it is governed by rule 23(d). 1 3 3 Thus, it is suggested that the evils
sought to be prevented by rule 23(e)-i.e., abuse of the class action device
or the harm caused to potential class members relying upon the class
complaint 13 4 -can be prevented by discretionary notice orders 135 without
unduly burdening voluntary settlements with an overinclusive per se rule. 136

130. See, e.g., Elias v. National Car Rental Sys., Inc., 59 F.R.D. 276 (D. Minn. 1973). The
court in Elias stated:
First it is clear that plaintiff desires to withdraw as a plaintiff individually and personally.
Were it not designated as a class action, this would end the matter. In view of the
requirements of rule 23(a)(4) it is clear that a plaintiff who desires to withdraw per;onally
as an individual is not one who will fairly represent and adequately protect the interests
of the class. One who wishes to cease his connection with the case cannot be a true class
representative. There is no one sought to be substituted for him and so the action must
fail for this reason alone.
Id. at 277. See also notes 50-53 and accompanying text supra. See generally Almond, supra note
3, at 321-23.
131. See notes 79-80 and accompanying text supra.
132. See H. NEWBERG, supra note 59, at 407. Professor Newberg states that "'Rule 23(e)
requiring court approval of dismissals applies before any class ruling has been made as well as
after there has been a class certification. By its terms, Rule 23(e) would not apply to non-class
actions or to actions which have been denied certification." Id.
133. See Shelton v. Pargo, 582 F.2d at 1309.
134. See notes 3 & 33 and accompanying text supra.
135. See Shelton v. Pargo, 582 F.2d at 1309. As the Shelton court pointed out, it is not
necessary to find that rule 23(e) applies in order for the trial court to have the "power" to issue
notice to putative class members. Id. The court observed that such power can be found in rule
23(d). Id. Moreover, even if rule 23(e) does apply in the precertification context, it is suggested
that the rule's language does not create an obstacle for implementation of the functional approach because the language of rule 23 has been found to be directory in other contexts. See,
e.g., Grand Rapids Furniture Co. v. Grand Rapids Furniture Co., 127 F.2d 245 (7th Cir. 1942)
(language of rule 23 is directory, not mandatory, and rule impliedly recognizes the right of all
members of class to join as plaintiffs if they so desire). Thus, it is submitted that insofar as rule
23
(e) may be deemed to apply to precertification settlements or dismissals, its language should
be construed as directory, applicable only where the mischief that the rule seeks to prevent
exists under the particular circumstances of the case. But see 2A C.D. SANDS, STATUTES AND
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION §§ 47.23, 57.10, at 423, 428 (4th ed. 1973) (suggesting that where
a statute grants authority to perform an act and prescribes the manner of performance, such
performance is mandatory, even though the decision whether to perform the act in the first
place was discretionary).
136. It is suggested that mandatory notice requirements are necessarily overinclusive if the
purpose of rule 2 3(e) notice is merely to prevent abuse of the class action device or to protect
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Moreover, use of the functional approach assumes continuation of the court's
approval power over settlements. 137 Accordingly, if abuse of the class action
device is found to exist prior to certification, the court can remedy such
abuse either by ordering notice or by simply denying approval of the settleclass action device is
ment. 138 Thus, it is submitted that the integrity of the
139
approach.
functional
the
under
protected
continually
It could be argued, however, that by construing rule 23(e)'s notice requirement to be discretionary while construing its approval requirement 4to0
be mandatory, the functional approach artificially bifurcates the rule.'
Nevertheless, it is contended that such bifurcation is defensible in light of
the balancing of conflicting policy interests necessitated by a proper construction of the rule. 14 1 Since rule 23(e) is designed to prevent abuses of the
class action device, as well as to protect the interests of absent class members, 142 it is suggested that the mischief sought to be prevented can only be
excised if the settlement is subject to the approval of court. 1 43 If the mis-

the reliance interest of putative class members. See notes 3, 31 & 46-50 and accompanying text
supra. As one study has noted:
[Wihile pre-certification dismissal does not legally bind absent class members, notice may
be appropriate under some circumstances to afford absentees an opportunity to intervene
and take over the class suit, or to file individual claims. The judge's authority to order
notice in the precertiflication situation is clear; the only question is when he should do so.
Developments, supra note 117, at 1541-42 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). The negative
implication of this statement is, it is suggested, that mandatory notice would be counterproductive in that it would unnecessarily delay litigation in the absence of a showing of abuse or
reliance, and it would dramatically increase litigation costs.
137. See Shelton v. Pargo, 582 F.2d at 1310.
138. See Magana v. Platzer Shipyard, Inc., 74 F.R.D. at 66-69.
139. 582 F.2d at 1310.
140. One commentator has noted that where mandatory language, as evidenced by the use of
the verb "shall," is used in different sections of the same statute, courts usually construe the
meanings of these sections consistently:
Similarly, an inference can be drawn from the use of the same verb in different but
related provisions of the same statute. Where a city charter provided that tax assessments
shall be made as of a certain date, and fully completed on or before a later date, the
court, having found the first provision mandatory, decided that it was not to be presumed
that the legislature used the mandatory verb in different senses in the same sentence.
2A C.D. SANDS, supra note 135, § 57.11, at 430, citing Sanford Realty Co. v. City of Knoxville,
172 Tenn. 125, 110 S.W.2d 325 (1937). Since rule 23(e) contains the same mandatory verb with
respect to both notice and approval, it appears that such bifurcation is in violation of the normal
canons of statutory construction.
141. See, e.g., Magana v. Platzer Shipyard, Inc., 74 F.R.D. 66-69. In Magana, the court
found that strict adherence to the rule's approval requirement does not deter settlements since,
at the point in time when court approval is required, settlement has already occurred. Id. All
that remains to be decided is whether the class action device has been abused and whether the
settlement is fair to putative class members. Id. Thus, it is suggested that a bifurcated construction of rule 23(e) reconciles the rule's policy goals, rather than putting them in conflict as
do the other approaches to the rule. See notes 123-32 and accompanying text supra.
142. See notes 3 & 31 and accompanying text supra.
143. See H. NEWBERG, supra note 59, § 4960, at 408. Professor Newberg has insisted that
court approval should be deemed mandatory:
Otherwise, the risk may exist that a court may deny class certification on the grounds that
an unwilling plaintiff cannot adequately represent the class, and then permit a dismissal of
the suit which may unwillingly result in prejudice to class members because of the running of the statute of limitations or other factors.
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chief exists, the court can deny approval or exercise any of the powers given
pursuant to rules 23(d) or 23(e). 144 If the mischief does not exist, approval of
the settlement or dismissal can be granted. 145 Absent such judicial supervision in the precertification context, it is contended that the safeguards of
rule 23 would be illusory.
With respect to the notice requirement, however, it is suggested that
the balance between the policy of encouraging voluntary settlements on the
one hand, versus protection of class interests and preserving the integrity of
the class action device on the other, tilts in favor of discretionary notice
rather than a per se requirement. 1 4 6 It is therefore submitted that the
bifurcated reading of rule 23(e) necessitated by application of the functional
approach is most consistent with the intent of the drafters of the 1966
amendments to rule 23-i.e., to create mechanisms flexible enough to be
147
utilized in complex litigation.
In sum, it is suggested that use of the functional approach will square
with several important policy considerations. First, it will allow maximum
protection of absentee class members since a prerequisite of the appproach
is strict judicial supervision over the individual facts and circumstances of
each case 148 with an eye towards prevention of collusion 149 and protection
of the reliance interest of absentee class members.' 15 Second, by not mandating litigation-generating requirements, such as notice, it will encourage
the voluntary settlement of complex litigation. 15 ' Third, it will allow efficient use of the class action device without creating collateral interlocutory
litigation over the meaning or construction of the federal class action

rules. 15 2 Finally, it puts the onus of administration of these suits within the
discretion of the trial judge, thereby allowing the flexibility needed to effectuate the spirit of rule 23.153
1d. (footnote omitted). This risk is especially present when the original class action was filed just
prior to the running of the statute of limitations. Id. § 4960, at 408 n.32. Moreover, it is
submitted that in the absence of a mandatory approval requirement, the sending of notice
becomes an ineffective act since those class members who fail to intervene or to file new actions
may be prejudiced by the unfairness or inadequacy of the relief available to the class. The
United States Supreme Court has held that absent class members are not to he deprived of the
protections of rule 23, nor are they required to actively participate in the suit in order to
receive such protections. See American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 543 (1973).
144. See FED. R. Ci'. P. 23(d), (e); note 1 supra; notes 75-77 and accompanying text supra.
It is submitted that preventing the abuse of the class action device and protecting the interests
of absentee class members is precisely the type of criteria judges usually use when determining
whether to approve a settlement or dismissal. See Magana v. Platzer Shipyard, Inc., 74 F.R.D.
at 66-67.
145. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(d), (e); notes 1 & 76 supra.
146. See notes 133-36 and accompanying text supra. See also Developments, supra note 117,
at 1542 n.32 (such a "flexible interpretation of rule 23(e) avoids ... a formalistic approach,...
[and] seems more compatible with the functional orientation of the 1966 amendments").
147. See note 146 and accompanying text supra. See also Developments, supra note 117, at
1628.
148. See notes 59-77 and accompanying text supra.
149. See Magana v. Platzer Shipyard, Inc., 74 F.R.D. at 66-67.
150. Id. at 70.
151. See notes 81-86 and accompanying text supra.
152. See Shelton v. Pargo, 582 F.2d at 1311.
153. See notes 72-86 & 114-17 and accompanying text supra.
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V. CONCLUSION

This comment has demonstrated that the issue of whether rule 23(e)
should be applied in a precertification context has been approached by federal courts using a myriad of techniques but has not yet been unequivocally
resolved. 154 Early cases opted for per se rules 155 running the gamut from
mandatory notice under rule 23(e) 156 to expedited certification under rule
23(c)(1). 1 57 This comment has noted that a more flexible approach, the socalled functional approach, 1 58 has commanded the majority of recent federal
court decisions on the precertification settlement issue. 1 5 9 It has been
suggested that the functional approach is necessary to vindicate the goals
sought to be achieved by the amendments to rule 23. While the 1966
amendments have been criticized, 160 and while proposals for further
amendment have been set forth, 1 6 1 it is submitted that use of the functional
approach would obviate the necessity for reform. This comment has further
suggested that the functional approach in its most liberal form 162 has the
63
incidental effect of encouraging voluntary settlement of complex litigation,1
thereby decreasing a major source of docket crowding. 164

In the absence of

a major overhaul of rule 23, and in the absence of a definitive ruling by the
United States Supreme Court on the proper construction of rule 23,165 it is
contended that the functional approach best allows the procedural safeguards
of rule 23 to function in the spirit contemplated by the amendments of
1966.166

Kevin Silverang
154. See notes 45-117 and accompanying text supra.
155. See notes 46-54 and accompanying text supra.
156. See notes 46-50 and accompanying text supra.
157. See notes 51-54 and accompanying text supra.
158. See notes 58-153 and accompanying text supra.
159. Sec notes 58-117 and accompanying text supra.
160. See, e.g., Labowitz, Class Actions in the Federal System and in California:Shuttering
the Impossible Dream, 23 BUFFALO L. REV. 601 (1974).
161. See, e.g., Kennedy, Federal Class Actions: A Need for Legislative Reforn, 32 S.W.L.J.
1209 (1979); Note, Class Actions and the Need for Legislative Reappraisal, 50 NOTRE DAME
LAv. 285 (1974).
162. See notes 114-22 and accompanying text supra.
163. See notes 133-39 and accompanying text supra.
164. One commentator has stated that "[miost class actions never reach trial" because
defendants will usually offer to settle, at least once the class has been certified. Almond, supra
note 3, at 305. It is suggested that approaches to the applicability of rule 23(e) in the precertification context which do not inhibit such settlements must necessarily decrease the docket
pressure in federal courts.
165. The United States Supreme Court has never ruled on the precertification settlement
issue. To date, the Second, Fourth, and Fifth Circuit are the only courts of appeals which have
specifically decided the question. See In re Beef Industry Antitrust Litigation, 607 F.2d 167 (5th
Cir. 1979); Shelton v. Pargo, 582 F.2d 1298 (4th Cir. 1'978); Weight Watchers, Inc. v. Weight
Watchers Int'l, 455 F.2d 770 (2d Cir. 1972).
166. See Shelton v. Pargo, 582 F.2d at 1311; notes 30-31 & 114-17 and accompanying text
su pra.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol25/iss3/3

20

